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~Rights' Are Not Enough: 
Prospects for a New Approach to the 
Morality of Abortion 
Philip J. Rossi, S.J. 
Father Rossi is an assistant professor and assistant chairman of the 
Marquette University theology department. 
The approach taken in this essay to the moral issues involved in 
abortion starts from the proposition that a particularly frustrating 
impasse has been reached both in scholarly discussion and in public 
debate about abortion. If we strip the professional and academic dis-
cussion of its scholarly and scientific niceties, and dampen the heat 
and passion of debate in the political and legal arenas, we find that 
each side, whatever its pro- or anti-rhetorical label, holds a funda-
mental conviction which to those on the opposing side seems implau-
sible. These convictions generally cluster the ide,as of "rights," "per-
son," and "choice." For instance, a fundamental conviction at the 
basis of a "pro-life " position is the fetus' early and definitive entitle-
ment to the rights of a person, while a fundamental conviction of a 
"pro-choice" position is the pregnant woman's definitive entitlement 
to the unimpeded determination of the course of her future. Although 
those who hold these convictions adduce arguments in their support, 
to those on the opposing side of the issue the arguments rarely, if ever, 
seem adequate to carry the weight of the conviction. To those on the 
opposing side, it often seems that the conviction would be held even if 
there were no argument to support it. 
Continued public discussion since the Supreme Court's abortion 
decisions has done little to overcome this impasse. Perhaps it is not yet 
time to abandon hope that further discussion of "rights," "persons," 
and "choice" could effect a consensus adequate for guiding at least 
some public policy decisions and even some personal moral decisions. 
While such discussion continues, however, the situation of impasse 
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makes it advisable to explore other perspectives on the moral issues 
involved in abortion in the hope that they might help us see our way 
through the impasse. 
I am therefore proposing a perspective for analyzing the moral 
dimensions of abortion which does not focus upon questions of 
"rights," important as these questions are. The focus of this perspec-
tive, instead, is on the question of what is truly good for human 
persons. From the standpoint of the history of philosophy, this per-
spective is by no means a "new" one; some of its most important 
features can be found in the ancient philosophers Plato and Aristotle. 
It is, however, a perspective which generally has not been put to use in 
the Gontemporary discussion of abortion. 1 This perspective tries to 
win some clarity for our thinking about the nature of what is good for 
human persons and about the conduct which effectively serves that 
good. It does so by specifically taking account of the moral signifi-
cance of the kinds of human good which have become ingredient in a 
situation as a result of the human conduct, practices and institutions 
which have brought it about. An account of the moral significance of 
these kinds of human good is of particular importance for discussion 
of abortion because judgments made about the morality of abortion 
- be they in general or in regard to particular cases - frequently 
presuppose judgments about the kinds of human good which are, or 
ought to be, served by some of the basic practices and institutions of 
our lives together in society. A perspective which brings to light these 
judgments about human good has the advantage of making plain to us 
more of what is morally at stake in such situations than can be seen 
from a perspective fashioned solely in terms of concepts such as 
"rights," "choice," and "persons." 
An elaboration of this perspective will show how it brings these 
judgments to light and enables us to consider their significance for the 
moral assessment we can make about abortion. This perspective pro-
vides a framework of concepts which enable us to understand and to 
delimit in moral terms the situation (or the types of situations) in 
which abortion might be considered as a possible course of action, 
either in an individual case, or as a practice to be discouraged, per-
mitted, or encouraged by public policy. In particular it views such 
situations arising at a point at which a set of important human institu-
tions, practices, and patterns of conduct that ought to serve human 
good intersect with a set of actions and decisions by particular human 
beings which have resulted in pregnancy. Some of the institutions, 
practices, and patterns of conduct which intersect with the particular 
actions and decisions are patterns of sexual conduct both within and 
outside the structure of married life and the family; patterns and 
practices of marriage and family life; patterns of economic opportun-
ity and the distribution of wealth, resources, and income; patterns of 
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statutory law, judicial interpretation, and executive enforcement 
which delimit the parameters of the legal exercise of rights; practices 
of medicine which delimit the parameters of physical and mental 
health. 
To delimit the situation adequately in moral terms we must be able 
to identify and assess the moral significance of the elements of each 
intersecting set. From this, we can then go on to make a sound moral 
judgment about possible responses to the situation, including that of 
abortion. When discussion of the morality of abortion employs, as its 
basic perspective, the concepts of " rights," "choice," and " persons" 
(where "person" primarily signifies " entitlement to rights " ), it views 
the situation along only one of its intersecting lines, i.e., the one 
framed by the set of actions and decisions made by particular persons 
insofar as they are bearers of rights and capable of choice. From this 
perspective, the institutions, practices, and patterns of conduct which 
enter into the fashioning of the situation, and the human "good" 
which they are to serve, are viewed obliquely: their moral significance 
is assessed and assessable only in terms of their bearing upon the rights 
and choices of the persons involved.2 The perspective I am proposing 
enables us to take sight upon the situation also along lines provided by 
the other set of intersecting elements, i.e ., along lines provided by 
human institutions and practices, and the good they serve. Such 
"sighting" asks of each of the elements of this set: What kind of 
human good does it serve and how does that good bear upon the 
situation? 
Failure to Raise Question 
Failure to raise this kind of question manifests itself in a sadly 
ironic way in many discussions of abortion. In this discussion, con-
siderations of " good" - especially of the human good which ought to 
be served by the human institutions and practices ingredient in the 
situation - are often presupposed and left unexamined in the very 
description offered of the situation. Such a situation is most fre-
quently described as an "unwanted pregnancy"; packed into that 
description - and the judgment consequent upon it, that abortion is a 
possible response to the situation - are assessments about the kind of 
human good which ought to be served by the institutions, practices 
and patterns of conduct already ingredient in the situation. 
Let me illustrate: the reasons which can be offered for a particular 
pregnancy or type of pregnancy being " unwanted" are numerous and 
varied; they range from a judgment of immediate danger to a woman 's 
life , through considerations for the well-being or the economic pros-
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pects of the family, to the inconvenience of interrupting a career or 
disrupting a personal relationship. Whatever the particular reasons or 
types of reasons may be, most, if not all of them presuppose some 
judgment about the kind of human good which ought to be served by 
the institutions and practices ingredient in the situation. For instance, 
patterns of economic opportunity or of economic expectations pre-
sumed to be worth pursuing can make particular pregnancies 
"unwanted." The "good" of marriage and family life is understood 
variously in our culture: it can be understood to serve as an ideal of 
self-fulfillment; it can be understood as a partnership to serve career 
ambitions or social expectations; it can be understood to be a partner-
ship fostering a mutual concern for others extending beyond the 
couple's relation. The judgment that a pregnancy is "unwanted" in par-
ticular cases is one that frequently seems to be made in conjunction 
with which good one assumes marriage to serve. It is obviously a judg-
ment which is more likely to be made when one takes that good to be 
simply self-fulfillment than when one takes that good to be a partner-
ship fostering a mutual concern for others extending beyond the 
couple's relation. Patterns of sexual conduct, whether within or out-
side of marriage, are often determined in our culture by critically 
unexamined presuppositions about how that conduct serves the 
psychological "good" or "health" or "integration" of human persons, 
or the "good" of a particular relation between persons.3 These pat-
terns, and the assumptions about "good" on which they are based, 
frequently function as a basis on which a pregnancy is judged "un-
wanted." Patterns of medical treatment and of the availability and 
distribution of health care can playa role determining what we con-
sider to be acceptable standards of physical and mental health. While 
functioning in the determination of whether a fetus is "normal," such 
standards can also more subtly function to determine the acceptability 
of particular forms of "abnormality" on emotional, financial, or 
social, as well as on medical, grounds.4 As a result, these patterns and 
practices, and the assumptions about the characteristic good of mental 
and physical health which they support, can also play a role in form-
ing a judgment whether a pregnancy is "wanted" or "unwanted." 
These illustra~ions should make clear that a description of a preg-
nancy as "unwanted" typically carries with it jUdgments, made implic-
itly and uncritically about the kinds of human good that are at stake 
in the situation and which ought to be served by a response to that 
situation. These implicit judgments about human good are then 'fur-
ther obscured by using "rights" and "choice" as the focus of discus-
sion. As a result, discussion of abortion conducted just from the van-
tage point provided by these concepts is unable to make a full critical 
examination of the significance of these implicit judgments about 
good for bur moral assessment of abortion. 
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Point Put in General Form 
This point can be put in a general form. Description of a pregnancy 
as "unwanted" presupposes a certain way of understanding human 
good: what is "good" is fashioned in terms of what we "want." This 
understanding predisposes us to see only certain moral possibilities for 
action when faced with a situation which has, or is likely to result in, 
an outcome which we do not want: the set of actions which can 
prevent, terminate, or mitigate the unwanted outcome. Analysis of the 
moral dimensions of such a situation from a perspective of "rights" 
and "choice" then reinforces this understanding of human good as a 
function of our wants, i.e., "rights" entitle us to take steps needed to 
pursue or obtain what we want; our wants and our choices in accord 
with such wants can be subject to constraint only when they come into 
conflict with the "rights" of others. Nothing fundamental to this con-
cept of " rights" or of "choice," however, requires us to doubt that 
"good " is to be fashioned in terms of our wants , nor does constraint 
placed upon the pursuit of our wants in virtue of the rights of others 
require us to question whether what we want, or whether our wants 
themselves, are good. As a result, moral analysis conducted in terms of 
these concepts tends also to see the moral possibilities for action in 
such a situation to be constituted just to be actions which would 
prevent, eliminate, or mitigate the unwanted outcome. 
A significantly different understanding of human good and its rela-
tion to wants, and a more inclusive and challenging set of possibilities 
for moral action can be formed from the perspective proposed in this 
essay. This perspective requires us to consider the possibility that we 
can fashion what we want in terms of what is good ; it opens up for us 
the possibility of taking actions that make us realign or even change 
our wants. In its analysis of a situation of "unwanted" pregnancy it 
requires us to consider, as possible and morally appropriate responses, 
actions which would make the pregnancy wanted rather than elim-
inate it because it is unwanted. 
The introduction into public discussion of the perspective I have 
sketched out will not be an easy undertaking. I will conclude this 
essay by suggesting two ways in which such an introduction could be 
made. These two ways require a more careful and detailed articulation 
than can be given here; I offer them now in outline in the hope of 
provoking more extended discussion which would provide the needed 
articulation . 
The first way would be to propose to the various parties in public 
and scholarly discussion that there is a need for them to offer a 
critically justified account of what constitutes human good in general, 
and of the various kinds of particular human good, in virtue of which 
judgments are made about whether a pregnancy is "wanted" or 
"unwanted." These accounts should also be shown to require consid-
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eration of the social character of the good served by the human prac-
tices and institutions ingredient in the situation.5 Two areas of h uman 
conduct in which such accounts of "good" are especially needed for 
the discussion of abortion are in regard to the institutions and prac-
tices of marriage and family life and in regard to the patterns and 
practices of sexual conduct. In particular need of critical eluc idation is 
the social character of the good served by marriage and family life and 
the consequences which this has for the way we are to understand the 
good to be served by human sexual conduct. 
Resources in Theological/Philosophical Underpinnings 
There are, I believe, resources within both the philosophical and the 
theological underpinnings of a position which judges a fetus to be 
human life from the beginning which can be developed to say true and 
significant things about the social context in which such life is to be 
introduced and fostered. Some of the things such a position could say 
are clearly " countercultural" in a society which has increasingly fos-
tered, by its practices, an understanding of the "good" of marriage 
and family life in terms of its service of personal self-fulfi llment and 
economic well-being, and an understanding of the "good" of sexual 
conduct in terms of its service of an ideal of psychological " integra-
tion" and "adjustment." It is quite obvious that as such an under-
standing of the good of these institutions and practices becomes ever 
more deeply embedded in our culture , the less likely abortion wi ll be 
seen to be even morally problematic; it is even less likely that grounds 
will be found for a general agreement on public policy discouraging 
abortion and offering effective support for alternatives. 
Development of the kind of account I am suggesting could, on the 
other hand, allow persons whose convictions are "pro-life" to spell out 
more clearly the elements of human good, both personal and social, 
served by marriage, family life , and sexual conduct, which lie at the 
basis of their conviction. Such an account wou ld introduce into public 
and academic discussion a pointed and thoroughgoing critique of -the 
underlying presuppositions about the human good served by these 
practices which form the basis for the cultural and societal conditions 
that have tended to make abortion morally unproblematic in late 20th 
century America; insofar as those same presuppositions are often oper-
ative in the articulation of "pro-choice" positions , such a critique 
would require those positions to set forth for critical dIscussion their 
understanding of the human good which is to be served by those 
institutions and practices. 
A second way for introducing this perspective in the discussion of 
abortion would be through the formulation of the kinds of questions 
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which point out the inadequacies of a moral analysis conducted solely 
from a perspective of "rights." Such questions would help show the 
rather ironic fact that, for all the rhetoric which connects "rights" to 
"persons" and the respect due them, this perspective for moral anal-
ysis most frequently functions in terms of a highly abstract under-
standing of human persons: the exercise of rights is given value in 
abstraction from the history, the future, and the concrete set of social 
relations in which the person exercising the right stands. Human good 
is focused down to the good of the exercise of rights. As a result of 
this abstract understanding of the human person, one rarely finds 
posed the questions of what human good is served by the exercise of 
particular rights, or of how the exercise of this (or any other) "right" 
fosters the establishment of the dispositions and traits requisite for 
becoming a good person. 
Once such questions are raised, it would then enable us to form our 
moral judgments on the basis of the set of moral concepts which allow 
us to specify the kinds of concrete human good served by the exercise 
of rights: these are the concepts of "character," "virtue," and "moral 
skills." 6 These concepts enable us to bring to bear upon the concrete 
decisions and actions of individuals the perspective we gain by sighting 
along the idea of good. They are concepts which enable us to anchor 
the exercise of particular human rights to considerations of human 
good and to the concrete history, future, and social relations of the 
persons in the situation. 
Let me offer in conclusion an illustration of how one of these 
concepts, "moral skill," can be of use in sorting out the moral signifi-
cance of one kind of situation to which abortion, or the exercise of a 
" right" to abortion, has been proposed as a desirable solution. The rise 
in the incidence of pregnancy among young teenagers has recently 
gained attention in public discussion . Inevitably, discussion focused 
upon "rights," e.g., in the light of Supreme Court decisions, is a young 
woman to be granted the "right" to seek an abortion without her 
parents' consent? That issue, in turn, generates more discussion 
focused on "rights," be it about parental rights, rights of access to 
birth control information, or rights of confidentiality in a physician-
patient or counselor-client relation. Such discussion from the perspec-
tive of "rights" does not require (nor frequently even allow) us to 
examine whether misperceptions of human good, or whether failures 
in the effective fashioning of what is authentically good for the per-
sons involved, have brought the situation about ; neither does it require 
, us to raise the question of how a morally appropriate response should 
address itself to remedy the moral misperceptions or moral ineffective-
ness which have brought the situation about. 
On the other hand, analysis from a perspective of human good, 
brought to focus upon the fostering and exercise of moral skills, 
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would enable us first, to locate those failures in moral perception 
which contribute to the phenomenon of increased teenage pregnancy, 
and then to determine their significance for the judgment we can 
make about appropriate moral responses. We can locate one major 
type of moral misperception of what is good for human persons and 
subsequent failure to exercise the moral skills required for fostering 
such good in the attitudes and patterns of conduct which commonly 
and unrefiectively define parent-to-child, person-to-person, and per-
son-to-institution relations in our culture. Instances of such mispercep-
tions can be found in attitudes and patterns of conduct which con-
ceive of the parent as "pal," or in which rivalry is unconsciously 
fostered by parents making their children the focus of their own 
unfulfilled life expectations; these all seem to view awry the human 
good which parent-child relations should serve. As a result, they pre-
vent the fostering of the moral skills of mutual trust and respect 
requisite for adequate moral perception and conduct both in the rela-
tion itself and in other activities significantly touched by it. Another 
form of misperception is one that tolerates or encourages patterns of 
social relations, among young persons and adults alike, which places a 
premium on sexual attractiveness, makes it definitory of the worth of 
the relation, and makes the test of such relations the adequacy of 
sexual promise or performance; another misperception of the authen-
tic good for human persons which can be located from this perspective 
is the perpetuation of economic and social practices which create for 
certain groups in our society conditions of such unrelieved desperation 
for which escape can be found only in pitiful and often tragic self-
assertions of violence and promiscuity. 
The list of items which could be picked out as elements ind icative 
of massive moral failure at the roots of this phenomenon of increased 
teenage pregnancy is depressingly long and cuts across social and econ-
omic distinctions. Each item of failure points to the fact that in our 
culture's frenetic pursuit of the goods of econom ic well-being and 
psychic self-satisfaction, we have paid no attention to, and allowed to 
wither the institutions, practices and customs that signify a commit-
ment to basic trust in one another and which enable us to develop and 
exercise the skills to care for one another 's total well being: marriage 
as a school for self-giving and fidelity; the family as the locus for a life 
infused by trust and mutual respect; and the civic and religious com-
munity as the realm in which our hopes and aspirations for each other 
are given stable form and entrusted to the future. 
To situations which result from these forms of moral blindness and 
the failure to develop the effective moral skills of trust and care, a 
moral perspective formed by a consideration of "rights " and "choice" 
can only offer a counsel of despair: It allows and encourages us to let 
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others - particularly the most helpless others - bear the burden of 
our fai lures. We must be able to do better than this; it is my hope that 
the development of a perspective focused on the concepts of human 
good, and moral skills will enable us to do better. 7 
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